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I. INTRODUCTION
Atypically, the Supreme Court of Florida was not active during the past
year, deciding no cases in the juvenile law field. On the other hand, the in-
termediate appellate courts were active both in the delinquency area and in
the dependency field.' As in the past, decisions in the delinquency area in-
volving generic issues of criminal procedure not unique to juvenile delin-
quency are not covered in this article.
II. DEPENDENCY
"A parent's right to counsel in a dependency case in Florida is purely
statutory."2 The Supreme Court of Florida had held in 1980 in In re Interest
of D.B., that parents did have the right to appointed counsel if indigent in
termination of parental rights (TPR) cases but not as an absolute right in de-
pendency cases4 Initially, as a result of the decision in In re Interest of D.B.,
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. This
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011. The
author thanks Nikki Dividze for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., K.J.F. v. State, 44 So. 3d 1204, 1205, 1209-11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2010); S.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of J.D.), 42 So. 3d 938, 938-
40 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); W.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re Interest of C.S.),
41 So. 3d 433, 433 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); W.G. v. S.A. (In re Interest of
A.G.), 40 So. 3d 908, 909-10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
2. Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Depen-
dency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35
NOVA L. REV. 305, 336 (2011); see FLA. STAT. § 39.402(5)(b)(2) (2011).
3. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
4. Id.at9O-91.
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parents were required to be given counsel in all TPR cases and under certain
situations in dependency cases.' Subsequently, the Florida Legislature
passed a law codifying the opinion and then, as a result of a series of rever-
sals in the appellate courts for failure to assign counsel in dependency pro-
ceedings pursuant to In re Interest of D.B., the Legislature in 1998 amended
chapter 39 to provide for the "appointment of counsel for parents in depen-
",6dency as well as TPR cases.
The issue of whether a non-offending parent should be appointed coun-
sel in a dependency case came before the Third District Court of Appeal in
W.G. v. S.A. (In re Interest of A.G.). 7 In that case, the father of a child who
was the subject of a dependency proceeding sought "certiorari review of an
order denying his motion for appointment of counsel."8 The mother, the
custodial parent, had been charged in a dependency proceeding with abuse,
although no charges were brought against the father.' The appellate court
held that as a matter of statutory construction, the reference to parents for
purposes of appointment of counsel did not make a distinction between of-
fending and non-offending parents.'o The court recognized that if a parent
was non-offending, there would be no logical grounds, and in fact, it would
be frivolous to charge that parent." The court held that "as a matter of com-
mon sense, the non-offending parent may need, and indeed [would] be en-
titled to take action" with regard to the possible relief ordered by the court. 2
Finally, as the court said, "a 'non-offending,' indigent, non-attorney parent
can hardly be expected to navigate through such proceedings without coun-
sel. At any juncture, failure to act could prejudice the non-offending parent's
rights in intervention." 3 For these reasons, the court granted the petition and
quashed the court order below denying the right to counsel.14
Evidentiary issues come up regularly in dependency proceedings in
Florida. 5 In W.S. v. Department of Children & Families (In re Interest of
C.S.),1 6 the parents appealed from an order adjudicating their child depen-
5. Id.
6. See FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (1999); Dale & Reidenberg, s
7. 40 So. 3d 908, 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. In re Interest ofA.G., 40 So. 3d at 910.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Michael J. Dale, 2009 Survey of Juvenile Law, 34
(2009).
16. 41 So. 3d 433 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
upra note 2, at 336-37.
NOVA L. REV. 199, 201-02
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dent.'7 They argued that the court relied upon inadmissible hearsay to make
its finding.'8 The Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the Guar-
dian ad Litem Program conceded error.'9 The hearsay was testimony from
an investigator describing what other foster children in the home said about
the parents' care.20 "The investigator did not personally observe any of the
[reported] abuse . . . ."2  Nor did any other witnesses testify as to the physi-
cal abuse.22 The trial court finding was based entirely on hearsay testimony
which demonstrated the "probability of prospective abuse." 23 The appellate
court held that the Florida Rules of Evidence "applicable in civil cases also
apply in adjudicatory hearings under [c]hapter 39."24 There being no excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, and the trial court having relied almost entirely on
the inadmissible hearsay, the appellate court reversed and remanded.25
In S.D. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of
J.D.),26 a mother appealed from an order adjudicating her child dependent on
the ground that the evidence "was legally insufficient to sustain the determi-
nation."27 One of the witnesses was a child protection investigator who gave
his opinion that the bruises that he saw often look like those resulting from a
"struggle and attempted choke."2 ' At issue in the case was whether the father
had a history of domestic violence and whether the mother was a victim of
domestic violence.29 When the protective investigator met with the mother,
"she had scratches on her neck and chest."30 She replied that "she sometimes
scratche[d] herself around her throat when she [was] anxious." 31 The appel-
late court held that "the only evidence of domestic violence was the child
protective investigator's opinion as to the cause of the scratching and bruis-
ing on the [m]other's neck." 3 2 Without addressing the question of whether
the opinion testimony was admissible as either expert testimony or proper lay
17. Id. at 433.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In re Interest of C.S., 41 So. 3d at 433.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 433-34.
25. Id. at 434.
26. 42 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
27. Id. at 938.
28. Id. at 939.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. In re Interest of J..D., 42 So. 3d at 939.
32. Id.
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testimony,33 the court held that in any event there was no evidence "that the
child saw or heard any alleged violence or was otherwise . . . [present for]
such violence" as required by Florida law.34 Thus, the appellate court re-
versed.
Dependency determinations may be based on what the Florida courts re-
fer to as "prospective neglect." 36 The Florida courts have regularly ruled on
the question of prospective neglect 37 beginning with the supreme court opi-
nion in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services. In R.M.
v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of J.B.), 39 a
mother appealed from a dependency adjudication on abuse of discretion
grounds where the finding was based on prospective neglect.40 The trial
court had found a significant danger posed to the child by the mother's per-
sistent anger management problems. 41 To make a finding of prospective
neglect, the court must find "a nexus between the parent's problem and the
potential for future neglect." 42 The testimony from family members as to the
mother's chronic use of marijuana, her impairment, her failure to pay atten-
tion to her son, and that her marijuana use put her in danger were "predictive
of a risk of harm to [the] child."43
A significant procedural issue arose in C.R. v. Department of Children
& Family Services,44 where a dependency adjudication was based upon the
mother's consent and where there was an administrative finding that the
child had no legal father.45 In its dependency order, the trial court withheld
adjudication as to the mother.46 When the father came forward, the trial
court vacated its order of disposition and then adjudicated the child depen-
33. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.701, .702 (2011).
34. In re Interest of J.D., 42 So. 3d at 940.
35. Id.
36. 1 MICHAEL J. DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT I 4.14[4][d] (MB 2011). For a
discussion of the subject nationally, see id.
37. Michael J. Dale, 2005-2006 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 31 NOVA L. REV. 577,
594-95 (2007); Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV. 397,
413-14 (2005).
38. 577 So. 2d 565, 565 (Fla. 1991).
39. 40 So. 3d 917 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
40. Id. at 917-18.
41. Id. at 918.
42. Id. (emphasis added) (citing N.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest
of T.B.), 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
43. Id.
44. 53 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
45. Id. at 241.
46. Id.
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dent as to the father and issued a subsequent order of dependency.4 7 The
mother appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it vacated the
initial order withholding adjudication as to the mother.48 The appellate court
held that "the trial court should have allowed the [w]ithhold [a]djudication
[o]rder to stand and then, [should have] held a subsequent evidentiary hear-
ing to determine the father's status" because the Florida statue allows a sup-
plementary decision to be entered which, in the case at bar, would have al-
lowed a determination of the father's status.49
In Florida, there is a procedure known as a private dependency action."o
A.N.B. ex rel. J.TN. v. Department of Children & Families" is a case in
which maternal grandparents brought a dependency proceeding, and the
mother appealed from an order of adjudication of the child "who was nine-
teen days short of [the] seventeenth birthday when the order was entered."5 2
The appellate court found that there were adequate grounds for a finding
"that there was no parent capable of supervision and care" under the Florida
statute.53 In addition, the mother appealed on the ground that the "court im-
properly based its ruling on the child's preference."' The appellate court
held "that the child's preference is not a valid basis for a finding of depen-
dency, but [in the case at bar], this was not the sole basis for the court's . . .
finding.""
When there are placements of children in other states or other interstate
issues arise in dependency cases, the Interstate Compact for the Placement of
Children (ICPC) comes into play.56 Issues can arise concerming proper im-
plementation of the ICPC as in Department of Children & Families v. .T ex
rel. M.R. 7 In a per curiam opinion, the appellate court reversed a trial court
order that reunited children with their mother, as well as dismissed a depen-
dency proceeding, terminating the trial court's jurisdiction for failure to
comply with the ICPC."' The children had been adjudicated dependent be-
47. Id. at 241, 243.
48. Id. at 241-42.
49. C.R., 53 So. 3d at 243; see FLA. STAT. § 39.507(7)(b) (2011).
50. See FLA. STAT. § 39.501; see, e.g., A.N.B. ex rel. J.T.N. v. Dep't of Children & Fami-
lies, 54 So. 3d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
51. 54 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 1050.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See FLA. STAT. § 409.401, art. 1 (2011).
57. 42 So. 3d 962, 963 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
58. Id.
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cause of "domestic violence between their mother and her paramour."" Sub-
sequently, the mother and father "moved out-of-state to Georgia and Ohio
[and] sought reunification."' "[T]he trial court directed DCF to obtain or-
ders of compliance with [the] ICPC for home studies on both parents."6 1
"DCF did not submit the ICPC orders to [either state's] compact administra-
tors" for a period of time.62 Despite the lack of compliance, the trial court
ordered reunification. 63 The appellate court noted that while "[t]he trial court
was understandably frustrated," a trial court, it held, cannot return the child
to a receiving state without compliance of all of the requirements of the
ICpC.64
Dependency cases occasionally arise involving immigrant children.65
Two such cases are In re Interest of T.J.' and L.T. ex rel. K.S.L. v. Depart-
ment of Children & Families.67 In In re Interest of T.I., "[r]epresentatives of
the Florida International University College of Law Immigrant Children's
Justice Clinic, as next friends of [the child], . . . appeal[ed] a circuit court
order summarily denying [an] amended petition for an adjudication of de-
pendency."68 The child, who had been "born in Turks and Caicos and came
to Florida at the age of four months, . . . lived [in Florida] continuously since
then" and was to turn eighteen relatively shortly after the dependency pro-
ceeding began. 69 The child had been cared for by her mother, but when her
mother passed away, and as the whereabouts of the father, who had left the
child and the mother when the youngster was an infant, were unknown, a
volunteer provided her with a place to stay. 70 The volunteer did "not have
any judicially-conferred status as a custodian or guardian of [the child]," and
thus a dependency proceeding was brought.7' The appellate court held that,
based on earlier case law, the child had no legal custodian.72 The child,
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. T.T. ex rel. M.R., 42 So. 3d at 963.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 963-64 (citing Dep't of Children & Families v. Fellows, 895 So. 2d 1181, 1185
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
65. See, e.g., In re Interest of T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011);
L.T. ex rel. K.S.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 48 So. 3d 928, 929 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
66. 59 So. 3d 1187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
67. 48 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
68. In re Interest of T.J., 59 So. 3d at 1188.
69. Id.at1189.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1190, 1194.
184 [Vol. 36
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therefore, "ha[d] made a prima facie case that she [was] dependent."" In a
two to one opinion, the court majority also concluded in dicta that the depen-
dency issue was not a "back door route to naturalization."74 The child quali-
fied for a declaration of dependency under the Florida Statutes, and thus
"'the child's motivation to obtain legal residency status from the United
States Attorney General [was] irrelevant.'" 7  The court then remanded on the
ground that the petitioner must demonstrate making a diligent search to find
the father.
In L.T., relied upon by the court in In re Interest of T.J., the child had
been rescued from a boat that capsized off the coast of Florida.77 The child's
uncle filed a dependency proceeding on the child's behalf.78 "[A]n adjudica-
tion of dependency would allow [the child] to petition as a special immigrant
juvenile." 79 The child's parents were deceased and the child was close to
eighteen years of age.80 The uncle had been the youngster's caregiver for
nine months and continued to do so.8' Over the objections of DCF, the court
reversed and remanded to the trial court, which had dismissed the petition for
dependency."
In Florida, when foster children age out of the child welfare system, as
adults, they may be entitled to educational and vocational training under the
state's Road to Independence Program (RTI). In Department of Children
& Family Services v. K.D.,8 DCF appealed from a trial court order that a
child was eligible for RTI funds even though "she had been living with a
non-relative court-approved guardian rather than in foster care." The trial
court decided "that the statute's eligibility provisions violated equal protec-
tion by unfairly [providing] services to foster children but not to [those]
children [who were] living in non-relative placements."8 The appellate
73. In re Interest of T.J., 59 So. 3d at 1190 (citing L.T. ex rel. K.S.L. v. Dep't of Children
& Families, 48 So. 3d 928, 930 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010); F.L.M. v. Dep't of Children &
Families, 912 So. 2d 1264, 1268-69 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam)).
74. Id. at 1191 (quoting Id. at 194-95 (Wells, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
75. Id. (quoting F.L.M., 912 So. 2d at 1269).
76. Id.at1192,1194.
77. Id. at 1190 (citing L.T. ex rel. K.S.L., 48 So. 3d at 929).
78. L.T. ex rel. K.S.L, 48 So. 3d at 929.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 929-31.
83. FLA. STAT. § 409.1451(5)(b) (2011).
84. 45 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 49 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 2010).
85. Id. at 47.
86. Id.
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court held that as a matter of statutory construction, the term foster care
means licensed foster care home. A person or a family providing foster
care must be licensed.88  The court reversed and remanded, although it
granted a motion for certification to the Supreme Court of Florida on the
issue of the definition.89
A second case involving RTI is Wade v. Florida Department of Child-
ren & Families.90 There, the appellant was notified by DCF services that it
planned to terminate her RTI scholarship because she failed to attend school
full-time or make satisfactory progress during the prior year.9' She was noti-
fied of her right to request a fair hearing, which she did.92 A fair hearing
followed, and the hearing officer entered an order affirming DCF's decision
to terminate the scholarship.9 3 The order was entered as a "final order."94 It
also included a notice of right of appeal.95 The appellate court held that the
order was not a final order in the sense of it being final agency action be-
cause the decision was not reviewed by the secretary of DCF, and "it is the
secretary's decision that is the final agency action [which is then] subject to
judicial review."96 For this technical reason, the appeal was dismissed.97
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Florida, like other states, provides multiple grounds for termination of
parental rights in its statutes.98 One of these grounds is where a "parent. . . is
incarcerated in a state or a federal ... institution." 99 In a case of first impres-
sion recently decided in the Second District Court of Appeal, the question
was whether the provision that there be no "commission of [a] new law vi-
olation[] constitutes a valid case plan task," which may then support a deci-
sion to terminate a parent's parental rights when the parent's imprisonment
results in "a new law violation, [which makes] it impossible for [the parent]
87. Id. at 48 n.2 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(31),409.175(4)(a) (2009)).
88. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 409.175(4)(a)).
89. K.D., 45 So. 3d at 48-49.
90. 57 So. 3d 869, 870 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Wade, 57 So. 3d at 870.
96. Id. at 872.
97. Id.
98. FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2011); see also DALE, supra note 36, at I4.14[4][a]-[h].
99. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(l)(d).
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to complete . . . other case plan tasks within the allotted time."'" In M.N. v.
Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of C.N.),'0 ' the
appellate court held "that the statutory scheme for ... termination of parental
rights," which includes a provision for termination based upon imprison-
ment, is "the exclusive method for . . . termination . . . based [upon] the fact
of [the] parent's incarceration." 0 2 Thus, inclusion of a provision in a case
plan that the "parent [not] commit [a] new law violation[] . . . may not prop-
erly be included as a case plan task. The breach of such a task that results in
the parent's incarceration," the court held, by itself, is not "a proper ground
for the termination of parental rights." 03 The court noted that there is "a
comprehensive and detailed list of twelve [distinct] grounds for . .. termina-
tion of parental rights" in Florida.'"0 The commission of a crime is not
among them.'0o Finally, the court noted, a chapter 39 case plan "was [not]
intended to be a form of criminal probation." 0 6 For these reasons, the court
reversed.'07
The termination of parental rights sometimes occurs on the basis of
consent documents signed by the parents in which case a specific statutory
requirement as to their filing with the court is required.'0 8 In T.H. v. Depart-
ment of Children & Families,'" the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed
the trial court because it failed to receive the proper documentation.o"0 In the
underlying case, a mother consented to termination of parental rights "condi-
tioned upon [her children] being adopted by her sister who lived in Tennes-
see."'" When that adoption did not go forward, the mother moved for recon-
sideration of the termination of parental rights which was denied and her
rights were terminated." 2 She then appealed." 3 The appellate court found
that the trial court had erred in terminating parental rights "because the writ-
ten surrenders [of parental rights] were neither filed, nor examined [by the
court], to determine [whether] they comported with statutory require-
100. M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of C.N.), 51 So. 3d 1224,
1225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
101. 51 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
102. Id. at 1225-26.
103. Id. at 1232; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806.
104. In re Interest of C.N., 51 So. 3d at 1232.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1233; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1).
107. In re Interest of C.N., 51 So. 3d at 1234.
108. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(a)(1).
109. 56 So. 3d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
110. Id. at 155.
Ill. Id. at l51-52.
112. Id. at 154.
113. Id. at l51.
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ments."ll4 Statutory grounds not having been met, the appellate court re-
versed."'
It is not uncommon for termination of parental rights to involve parents
who have mental health problems."'6 The question, however, in a termina-
tion of parental rights case, as in I.Z. v. B.H.," was whether the mother's
mental health issues "pose[] a risk to the child's well-being" in order to justi-
fy termination of parental rights under the Florida statute."'8 Among the
grounds for termination of parental rights is "section 39.806(1)(c), which
provides ... that the parent's conduct towards the child ... demonstrates . . .
continu[al] involvement of the parent . . . [with the child] threatens the life,
safety, well-being, or . .. health of the child irrespective of the provision of
services.""9 The appellate court reversed on this ground and on others, find-
ing that the only evidence of mental health issues that threatened the child's
well-being were at a visit where "the mother began to raise her voice and
told the child she was 'spoiled.' [Whereupon] workers told the mother she
was scaring the child and removed the child to safety." 20 That event oc-
curred three years earlier, and on that ground and others, the appellate court
reversed.121
IV. CRIMINAL CHILD NEGLECT
Under Florida law, as is true in other jurisdictions, the State may charge
a parent with criminal child neglect as well as charge the parent through the
DCF with civil child neglect.12 2 In State v. Nowlin,123 a seventeen-year-old
mother was at home babysitting a neighbor's two-year-old daughter when it
was alleged that a pit bull she owned, and which had bitten another neigh-
borhood child, mauled the two-year-old child.124 "The State charged [the
seventeen year-old] with neglect of a child causing great bodily harm, a
second-degree felony . . . ."125 The trial court held that the seventeen-year-
old could not be held criminally liable as she was a juvenile when the event
114. T.H., 56 So. 3d at 154.
115. Id. at 155.
116. DALE, supra note 36, at [4.14[4][b].
117. 53 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
118. Id. at 409.
119. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c) (2011).
120. I.Z., 53 So. 3d at 409-10.
121. Id. at 410.
122. See FLA. STAT. § 827.03; id. § 39.001(8)(a).
123. 50 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
124. Id. at 80-81.
125. Id. at 81.
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occurred, and was thus not a caregiver as defined by section 39.01(10) of the
Florida Statutes.126 Over a dissent, the appeals court held that the seventeen-
year-old indeed was a caregiver, and that the State had made a prima facie
showing thereof by demonstrating the seventeen year-old regularly, if not on
a daily basis, took care of the two year-old victim.127 The dissent argued that
the term "other person" in the statute governing caregivers is ambiguous and,
therefore, did "not give fair notice that a child may be held criminally liable
for negligent care of another child." 28
V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A very important Florida case involving the interpretation of the state
sex offender statute in the context of a juvenile delinquency case is K.J.F. v.
State.12 9 In that case, "a child appeal[ed] a final disposition entered after he
pled guilty to . . . sexual battery" and other sexual charges whereupon the
"court withheld adjudication of delinquency, placed [the child] on probation,
and [also] ordered [the child] to register as a sex[] offender.""o The appel-
late court reviewed the Florida juvenile delinquency statute.' and the sexual
offender statute 32 and found that a "plain-language interpretation of the defti-
nitions of a 'sexual offender' and 'convicted"' in the law demonstrate that
the statutory obligation of a juvenile to register as a sex offender "does not
apply to juveniles for whom adjudication of delinquency is withheld." 33 The
appellate court thus reversed.134
In 1975, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in Breed v.
Jones,135 that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to
juvenile delinquency proceedings.136 The issue before the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in V.M.S. v. State,137 was whether, when a circuit court
withheld adjudication and placed a juvenile on probation, it could subse-
quently modify the probation order to require the juvenile to attend a non-
126. Id. at 81-82; FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10).
127. See Nowlin, 50 So. 3d at 83.
128. Id. at 84 (Padovano, J., dissenting).
129. 44 So. 3d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
130. Id. at 1205.
131. FLA. STAT. § 985.4815 (2011).
132. Id. § 943.0435.
133. K.J.F., 44 So. 3d at 1206-07, 1211.
134. Id. at 1205.
135. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
136. See id. at 531; see also V.B. v. State, 944 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (per curiam); Lisak v. State, 433 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1983).
137. 43 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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public school and impose a fifty dollar charge under Florida's Crimes Com-
pensation Trust Fund.138 The appellate court found that a trial court may not
"enhance a defendant's probation without the state first charging, and the
court determining, that the defendant violated [the] probation."1 39 Because
the trial court in the case at bar "modified [the child's] probation without [the
youngster] having been found in violation of it, [t]he requirement that [the
juvenile] attend the PACE School was an enhancement [of] the original sen-
tence [making] the sentence more severe" and thus constituted double jeo-
pardy.'40 Further, the addition of the sentence assessing a fifty dollar pay-
ment obligation was also deemed an enhancement.'41 Thus, the appellate
court reversed. 142
A second double jeopardy case is ZC.B. v. State.143 In that case, the ju-
venile "challenge[d] [a] disposition order adjudicating him delinquent on a
charge of possession of cannabis."" Specifically, he claimed that the error
was in "adjudicating him delinquent after having dismissed the petition [and
subsequently] . . . imposing $115 [in] court costs." 4 5 When the State was
unable to twice proceed because witnesses were not present, the court dis-
missed the charge against the juvenile with prejudice.14 6 When the State,
later in the day, advised the court that the witnesses were present, the court
went ahead with the case, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and ac-
cepted a no contest plea subject to the right of appeal.'47 The appellate court
held that double jeopardy did not apply because the order of dismissal, as a
result of the State's failure to present evidence, is not an adjudicatory find-
ing.148 Thus, jeopardy had not attached when the court began the hearing on
the merits although it had previously dismissed the case.149 The court re-
versed the imposition of the $115 court costs because the child was only ad-
judicated on a misdemeanor offense.'
138. See id. at 939-40.
139. Id. at 940 (citing Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061, 1064-65 (Fla. 1994)).
140. Id. at 941.
141. See id.
142. V.M.S., 43 So. 3d at 941.
143. 40 So. 3d 36, 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 37-38.
148. ZC.B., 40 So. 3d at 38.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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An important issue of sequestering witnesses in delinquency cases arose
in L.E.D. v. State.'-' A child appealed from a finding of burglary of a dwel-
ling and grand theft on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in
sequestering the child's mother. 15 2  "At the beginning of the trial, [the
child's] defense counsel invoked the rule of sequestration of witnesses."'
However, the lawyer argued that the mother, who was a party to the case,
should not be sequestered.'5 4 The trial court disagreed, and the mother was
"sequestered until she was called as a witness [for] the defense."' 5  Under
Florida law, because a parent may be legally responsible for restitution, ser-
vice of process is to be made upon parents, and Florida law "contemplates
[that] parents' participation at both detention . . . and final disposition hear-
ings" are necessary;15 6 the parent is viewed as a party. The appellate court
held that it is not harmless error to sequester a parent who is a party, and that
under Florida law a parent, him or herself a party, is entitled to be present at
the adjudicatory hearing.'
Sometimes matters are heard by appellate courts involving issues that
ought to be, at first glance, obvious. One such case is R.O. v. State.'"' In
R.O., the State filed a delinquency petition charging the child with posses-
sion of cocaine and other offenses. 5 9 "[T]he State put on one police officer,
who testified [to the] charges." 60 Then, the defense put the child on "who
testified that he did not realize that the men stopping him were police, and
[that] he ran because he was afraid [of somebody] trying to rob him."' 6 ' The
defense asked the child no further questions.162 The court then began asking
questions in matters covered neither by the direct examination of the police
officer nor the direct examination by defense counsel, especially the cocaine
charge.163 "After the court questioned [the child], the State commenced
151. 48 So. 3d 167, 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 90.616 (2011) (governing sequestration).
156. L.E.D., 48 So. 3d at 169 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.219; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.010(a),
8.030(b)).
157. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.319; J.R. v. State, 923 So. 2d 1269, 1272 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2006)); L.B. v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)); see Interest of
Hopkins v. Youth Court of Issaquena Cnty., 227 So. 2d 282, 284 (Miss. 1969). But see
People v. Akers (In re Interest of Akers), 307 N.E.2d 630, 631-32 (111. App. Ct. 1974).
158. 46 So. 3d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
159. Id. at 125.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. R.O., 46 So. 3d at 125.
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cross-examination [as to the cocaine charge]."'6M On appeal, the child argued
"that the trial court departed from [its] role of neutrality when questioning
[the child] about the cocaine possession."s65 The appellate court held, citing
earlier authority, that "[a] court may not ask questions or make comments in
an attempt to supply essential elements to the State's case."1 66 The appellate
court held that the trial court, "sua sponte questioned [the child] to supply
essential elements of the prosecution's case. "l67 The trial court went to the
ultimate issue of guilt on its own.168 Thus, as the appellate court said, "the
trial court became an advocate for the prosecution, thus depriving [the child]
of his right to a fair and impartial trial." 1 69 The court thus reversed.o
In D.F.J. v. State,'7' the child appealed an adjudication of delinquency
for aggravated battery and robbery with a weapon. 7 2 The child contended on
appeal that the only evidence against him presented by the State was that "he
was present at the scene of the commission of the crimes and that he fled." 7 1
There was no evidence that the child assisted in the perpetration of the
crimes or that he had intent to join.174 Thus, the child "argu[ed] that the State
[had] failed to present evidence from which the judge could exclude the rea-
sonable hypothesis that [the child] was merely a witness" and thus not guilty
of the charges."' The appellate court recognized that the trial court evidence
was circumstantial. 7 6 However, despite the strength of the circumstantial
evidence pointing toward guilt, the appellate court held that such "evidence
must, nonetheless, rebut any hypothesis of innocence, including [the fact]
that [the child] was present [but] was merely a witness." 77 "[T]he only wit-
ness to the crime was the victim and he could not definitively state who at-
tacked him . . . .. 17 Thus, "the State was unable to overcome [the respon-
dent's] reasonable hypothesis of innocence," and reversal was required.179
164. Id. at 126.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Sears v. State, 889 So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
167. Id. (alteration in original).
168. R.O., 46 So. 3d at 126.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 60 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
172. Id. at 1184.
173. Id. at 1185.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. D.F.J., 60 So. 3d at 1185.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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The need for vigorous representation by defense counsel on behalf of
juvenile defendants is demonstrated in the second district case, Henderson v.
State.'80 There, a sixteen year-old was convicted of both battery on a person
over sixty-five and robbery.' 8 ' He appealed the judgment and sentence in-
cluding the trial court's failure to transfer him to the Department of Juvenile
Justice for dispositional placement.'82 The Department of Juvenile Justice
Multidisciplinary Panel recommended that the child remain in the juvenile
justice system, but the trial court rejected that alternative.'8 1 In affirming the
adult sanction of ten years in prison, the appellate court noted that the trial
lawyer did not advocate strenuously for the juvenile sentence.'8 The appel-
late court then affirmed, finding that "[t]he presumption of appropriateness
of adult sanctions compels us to conclude that this record provides no basis
for reversal on direct appeal."'8 One might infer from the court's language,
its reference to the trial lawyer's lack of strenuous representation, the de-
tailed nature of the Department of Juvenile Justice Multidisciplinary Panel
report, and the appellate lawyer's citation to Anders v. California,'86 that had
there been vigorous representation, its appellate ruling might have been dif-
ferent.'8 7
Practitioners know that cases are often continued because of the inabili-
ty of parties to proceed for a number of reasons, including lack of witness
availability. The issue of court discretion to therefore dismiss the charges in
juvenile delinquency cases came before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in
two cases: State v. S.M.M.'" and State v. A.D. C.,' 89 both involving problems
in the same circuit.' 90 In A.D.C., the State appealed an order denying its mo-
tion to continue a restitution hearing.' 9' In that case and in others, the State
did not have witnesses present at the trial, duly noticed on evidentiary hear-
ing time.192 In A.D.C., the appellate court held "that the State was diligent in
its [efforts] to prepare for the hearing and secure the attendance of its neces-
180. 61 So. 3d 494, 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Henderson, 61 So. 3d at 496 (emphasis added).
186. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (setting forth the method for appellate brief filing when
counsel does not believe there is a meritorious issue on appeal).
187. See Henderson, 61 So. 3d at 495-96.
188. 59 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
189. 59 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
190. Id. at 1209; S.M.M., 59 So. 3d at 1211.
191. A.D.C., 59 So. 3d at 1209.
192. Id.
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sary witnesses" and that it had not sought a prior continuance of the case.193
Furthermore, the respondent did not establish that he was "suffer[ing] any
prejudice as a result of [the] resetting."1 94 For these reasons, the appellate
court held that it was abuse of discretion to deny the motion to continue. 95
However, in S.M.M., a case involving an order dismissing a delinquency
petition, the appellate court held there was no abuse of discretion and thus
affirmed the dismissal.19 6 In that case, while recognizing that "dismissal is
an extreme sanction that should be employed only when lesser sanctions" are
not available, the appellate court held that the facts in that case did not in-
volve an isolated incident.19 7 There was "a systemic problem involving a
pattern of repeated failures by the State to [provide] witnesses for properly
noticed trials [and] other evidentiary hearings," and in the case at bar, there
had been at least one prior continuance of the date of trial, and "almost three
hours after the trial was scheduled to start the State had no definitive estimate
of when its witnesses might appear," nor any "explanation [for] why they
had not appeared." 98 The court thus affirmed the dismissal.' 9
In Florida, when a discovery violation occurs, the trial court is required
to hold what is known as a Richardson hearing.2m' Richardson v. State201
provides a test to determine whether a discovery violation is harmless or
whether there is a reasonable probability that the discovery violation proce-
durally prejudiced the defense.202 In T.J. v. State,203 the issue was whether
the trial court complied with Richardson where a juvenile was charged as a
"delinquen[t] with burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, third degree grand
theft, and criminal mischief."204 The juvenile appealed seeking to reverse the
adjudication on the ground that there was a Richardson violation in that the
State, on the first day of trial, listed two witnesses that were not known to the
defense.205 He argued that the late submission was error and not harmless. 206
The witnesses were a crime scene investigator and a latent fingerprint analyst
193. Id. at 1210.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. State v. S.M.M., 59 So. 3d 1210, 1211 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
197. Id. at 1212.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 775 (Fla. 1971).
201. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
202. Id. at 775.
203. 57 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
204. Id. at 976.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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and expert witness.20 7 The appellate court reversed on the grounds that "the
trial court [had] failed to hold an adequate Richardson inquiry" by failing to
ask "whether the discovery violation was willful or inadvertent, whether it
was substantial or [minor], and whether [it] had a prejudicial [impact] on the
defense's trial preparation.""' "[F]ailure to make an adequate inquiry is not
harmless error," the appellate court held.209 It thus reversed. 210
Timely filing of motions to suppress is required under the Florida Rules
of Juvenile Procedure.21 1 In C.M. v. State,212 a child appealed from an adju-
dication of delinquency for possession of cannabis on the ground "that the
trial court erred [in] denying his oral motion to suppress."2 13 When at trial,
the State attempted to admit into evidence the cannabis, which was found
near the child, counsel for the child objected on grounds of lack of chain of
custody and that the search was illegal.214 The State responded that the
child's counsel had not filed a motion to suppress.2 15 "The trial court refused
to consider [the] oral motion to suppress . . . [as] no written motion to sup-
press had been filed."216 The appellate court affirmed on grounds that in the
absence of the "lack[] [of] opportunity to make a motion to suppress prior to
the date of the adjudicatory hearing," it was not an abuse of discretion to
deny the motion.2 17
Being a disrespectful teenager is not grounds for adjudication as a de-
linquent for resisting a police officer without violence.218 In M.M. v. State219
this was exactly the issue. 220 A juvenile who was "neither under arrest nor
being detained when he refused to give his name or identification to [a] re-
questing officer" appealed his adjudication for resisting without violence
when the youngster walked away slowly from the officer, subsequently "re-
fused to give his name and claimed he had no identification on him." 221 At
no time was the child "under arrest or otherwise lawfully detained when he
207. Id.
208. TJ., 57 So. 3d at 977 (citing Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 775 (Fla. 1971)).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.085(a)(5) (2011).
212. 51 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
213. Id. at 541.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. C.M., 51 So. 3d at 541.
218. See M.M. v. State, 51 So. 3d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
219. 51 So. 3d 614 ( Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
220. See id. at 615-16.
221. Id. at 615.
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[refused] to give [the officer] his name or provide identification."222 The
appellate court reversed the adjudication finding that the youngster "did not
obstruct the officer in executing a legal duty."223
VI. OTHER MATTERS
Two other cases require analysis in this survey. The first is Statewide
Guardian ad Litem Office v. State Attorney Twentieth Judicial Circuit.224
The specific issue before the appellate court in Statewide Guardian ad Litem
Office was whether the circuit court in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit could
order the Guardian ad Litem Program to act as guardians ad litem in criminal
proceedings where children, allegedly "victims or witnesses of abuse [and]
22
neglect or sexual offenses," were expected to testify as witnesses.225 Appar-
ently, this had been an ongoing procedure in that circuit for some time pur-
suant to a local administrative order.226 Initially, the policy applied while the
Guardian ad Litem Program "was under the jurisdiction of the judiciary." 227
However, in 2003, the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program was placed
within the Justice Administrative Commission of the State of Florida, an
office of the executive branch of government.2 28 As the appellate court put
it:
When the guardian ad litem program was under the auspices
of the circuit court, no one disputed that the court had authority to
appoint guardians from its own program to represent any child that
needed a guardian ad litem under any statute authorizing such an
appointment. Now that the Statewide [Guardian ad Litem] is an
office in the executive branch, we conclude that the circuit court
can no longer compel the Statewide [Guardian ad Litem] to appear
and assist children in the absence of a statute that gives the court
such authority over an agency in another branch of government.229
222. Id. at 616.
223. Id.
224. 55 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
225. Id. at 748.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 749.
228. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.8296(2) (2011)).
229. Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, 55 So. 3d at 750.
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As things now stand, both the Guardian ad Litem Program and DCF ex-
ist in the executive branch, both with roles that would appear at first glance
to be quite similar in the context of dependency proceedings.230
The second case is Department of Children & Families v. D.B.D.2 3 1
that case, DCF appealed from "an order dismissing an ex parte injunction
entered against a father of minor children" under Florida's dependency sta-
tute.232 The appellate court held that the father was denied due process be-
,,233
cause "DCF failed to justify the continuation of the injunction. The un-
derlying facts are disturbing. In D.B.D., the mother who was an attorney for
the DCF in Miami-Dade County and the father, also an attorney, had what
the appellate court described as "an ongoing, contentious divorce case in
Broward County." 2 34 The family court in the divorce case had "ruled against
the mother on some of the allegations she made against the father." 235 Six
months after the family court "denied the mother an injunction she had
sought on behalf of her children, . . . the mother filed a pro se emergency
motion to suspend visitation, . . . [but] never called [the] motion up for hear-
ing before the family court judge."2 36 A month later, DCF filed a petition
seeking an injunction under Florida's dependency statute, making many of
the same allegations contained in the DCF attorney mother's pro se emer-
23
gency motion to suspend visitation. 2 On the day the dependency petition
was filed, "a hearing was held before [a judge] who was not the family court
judge familiar with the hostile dynamics of this family." 23 8 The father re-
ceived two hours notice of the hearing, but was in the Florida Keys and
asked to appear by telephone.239 When DCF objected, the court would not
allow the appearance. 240 Present were the mother, two lawyers, and three
DCF representatives. 241 None of them, all professionals according to the
appellate court, "advised [the judge] of the pending proceedings in the family
court," nor did he ask.242 At a short hearing, the DCF attorney sought and
received "an injunction that remained in effect until further order of the court
230. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 327, 333.
231. 42 So. 3d 916 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
232. Id. at 917 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.504).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d at 917.
237. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.504(1) (2011)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 918.
241. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d at 918.
242. Id.
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without . . . any further hearing."243 The trial court entered the injunction
which took effect immediately so that, according to the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, "the mother could leave [the] court with it in hand." 2" According
to the appellate court, although the trial court "had never seen [n]or heard
from the father, the injunction also ordered the father to undergo two evalua-
tions-for substance abuse and by a psychologist."245
A month later, before the family court judge,
[t]he judge found that the DCF petition for injunction was filed in
bad faith, and [that] the mother used her position as an attorney
with [DCF] to bypass [the] proceeding before [the family] court
[in order to] obtain an injunction before a dependency [court]
246judge who ha[d] no knowledge [of] the history of the parties.
The trial court dismissed the injunction and DCF then appealed, claiming
that the trial judge in the family court "improperly placed the burden of proof
on the Department to maintain the injunction [and] that the father was not
entitled to an immediate hearing to dissolve the injunction. [B]ecause the
husband had 'actual notice,' the injunction did not qualify as an immediate
injunction."247 The appellate court rejected these arguments, finding first
,,248that DCF's position "ignore[d] basic principles of due process. Citing an
expansive body of law which rejects the positions asserted by DCF, the ap-
249pellate court affirmed the family court dissolution of the injunction. In
rendering its opinion, the appellate court was unusually blunt:
To anyone familiar with the concept of due process, the abbre-
viated September 18 "hearing," consuming but eight pages of tran-
script, is shocking. Three attorneys were present-Ali Vazquez,
on behalf of DCF, Lee Seidlin, for the Guardian Ad Litem
[P]rogram, and the mother. None of the[se] attorneys made Judge
Rebollo aware of the ongoing proceedings in family court. None
of the[se] attorneys mentioned the mother's August 21 emergency
motion. None of the attorneys brought up the mother's previous
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d at 919-20.
247. Id. at 920.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 920-21.
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attempt to secure an injunction on behalf of the children, which
was denied.25 o
The appellate court then added: "A primary focus of DCF's attorney at
the hearing was how to avoid further scrutiny of the injunction at a time
when the person enjoined could have a meaningful opportunity to be
heard." 251
Perhaps to emphasize the severity of the attorneys' failure to act proper-
ly, the appellate court cited to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct
concerning ex parte proceedings, which state that "[i]n an ex parte proceed-
ing, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the law-
yer that [would] enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether
or not the facts are adverse."252
VII. STATUS OFFENSES-CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES
Chapter 984 of the Florida Statutes governs intervention in the lives of
families and children in need of supervision, known commonly as status of-
fenders.25 3 Cases involving status offenders do not come up regularly in the
254 255
appellate case law in Florida.254 A.B.S. v. State is an exception. In that
case, a juvenile who was charged as a delinquent for possession of a con-
trolled substance "admitted . .. the charge while reserving the right to appeal
[based upon] the denial of his motion to suppress."2 56 The child had been
"taken into custody as a possible runaway in need of services," one of the
status offense categories under chapter 984.257 The police officer took the
youngster into custody, told him that he would take the child home, but be-
fore he placed the child into the police cruiser, he handcuffed and searched
the child as was the officer's practice. 25 8 He found a key chain in the
youngster's pocket with "an aluminum screw-top container" which the police
officer believed was of the "type [usually] used to store illegal drugs." 25 9
250. Id. at 918.
251. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d at 919.
252. Id. at 919 n.2 (quoting FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-3.3(c) (2010)).
253. FLA. STAT. ch. 984 (2011); see generally DALE, supra note 36, at 15.02.
254. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REV. 819, 831 (1999)
(discussing the rarity of opinions regarding the Children in Need of Services/Families in Need
of Services Statute).
255. 51 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
256. Id. at 1182.
257. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 984.13(1)(a).
258. A.B.S., 51 So. 3d at 1182.
259. Id.
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When the officer shook it, it rattled. 2 60 That made the police officer suspi-
cious, and when the officer opened the container, the officer found a con-
trolled substance. 26' The appellate court reversed the denial of the motion to
suppress "because the [police] officer did not have a legal basis to search."262
It held that the circumstances under which "a juvenile [may] be taken into
custody [pursuant to] section 984.13 are not crimes." 2 6 3 "[T]herefore, [a]
search incident to [an] arrest exception to the warrant requirement d[id] not
apply." 264 There having been "no indication that [the child] was in posses-
sion of either a weapon or contraband when [the police officer] searched
[him] . . . the search was conducted without a legal basis, [and] the trial court
erred in denying the motion to suppress."265
V. CONCLUSION
The intermediate appellate courts were quite busy during the past sur-
vey year in the areas of dependency, termination of parental rights, and juve-
nile delinquency, ruling on a number of procedural matters as well as refin-
ing definitional language within the relevant statutes. The courts decided
one important case outside of these areas, affirming the proposition that the
Guardian ad Litem Program, like the DCF Services, is a division within the
Executive Department. 266 And, in one particularly troubling case, casting a
shadow on the legal profession, one appellate court castigated attorneys with-
in the DCF Services and Guardian ad Litem Program for their behavior in an
ill-conceived dependency matter.267
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing L.C. v. State, 23 So. 3d 1215, 1218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
263. A.B.S., 51 So. 3d at 1182 (citing L.C., 23 So. 3d at 1218; FLA. STAT. § 984.13 (2011).
264. Id. (citing L.C., 23 So. 3d at 1218).
265. Id.
266. Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office v. State Att'y Twentieth Judicial Circuit, 55 So.
3d 747, 749 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
267. Dep't of Children & Families v. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d 916, 917-20 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
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